In Counterfactual Conditionals, Daniel Dohrn discusses the standard account of counterfactuals, conditionals of the form ‘If A had been the case, then B would have been the case’. According to the standard account, a counterfactual is true if the then-sentence is true in all closest worlds in which the if-sentence is true. Closeness is spelled out in terms of an ordering of worlds by their similarity. Dohrn explores resources of defending the standard account against several challenges. In particular, he defends the standard logics for counterfactuals. He discusses exemplary doubts as to whether conditionals have truth conditions. He inquiries into the interaction between truth and probability of counterfactuals. He tackles problems with the similarity ordering. He addresses the interaction between counterfactuals and normalcy conditions. He closes with elaborating peculiarities of future-directed counterfactuals.
Daniel Dohrn studied philosophy and economics in Munich. His PhD (2001) dealt with Kant’s conception of the beauty and systematicity of nature. His habilitation (2006) was focused on Descartes’s idea of a rational will. More recently, he has worked on research projects in epistemology and the philosophy of language, concentrating on issues of merely hypothetical, possible, and impossible scenarios. He has worked as lecturer and researcher at the universities of Munich, Erlangen, Constance, Aachen, Berlin, and Milan. He has published in leading international journals like The Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Synthese, Erkenntnis, and The Journal of Aesthetics and Arts Criticism.